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SEPARATE BUT UNEQUAL - WHEN OVERCROWDED: SEX
DISCRIMINATION IN JAIL EARLY RELEASE POLICIES
LARA HOFFMAN*
ABSTRACT
It is currently constitutional to house male and female prisoners
in separate jail facilities based solely on gender. But is it also consti-
tutional to provide separate early release policies to male and female
prisoners convicted of the same crime, in the same county, and sen-
tenced to the same length of time based solely on gender and separate
housing arrangements? For decades, jail officials in many counties
have released some prisoners before the end of their judicially man-
dated sentences to relieve overcrowding and meet budget constraints.
A small study of jails around the country conducted as research for
this Article reflects the differences these early release policies can
have between genders. The United States Supreme Court has never
directly addressed the issue of differing early release policies based
on gender, and lower federal courts have only addressed the con-
stitutionality of unequal programs and services for male and female
inmates. Some of these courts analyzed prisoners' equal protection
claims under heightened or intermediate scrutiny, while others have
given wide discretion to prison administrators concerning varying
needs of individual prisons and applied only rational basis review.
This Article argues that all gender-based equal protection claims
made by prisoners should be analyzed using intermediate scrutiny,
rather than the more deferential rational basis test, and that male and
female prisoners subject to early release policies should be deemed
similarly situated in an equal protection analysis. Specifically, it
suggests that separate gender-based early release policies are not
gender-neutral, even when they appear facially neutral, because of
the causal relationship between these policies and the segregation
of men and women into separate prison facilities. Accordingly, the
Article finds such policies unconstitutional under the intermediate
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scrutiny standard. Finally, this Article concludes with suggestions for
altering these problematic early release policies in ways that are both
gender-neutral and cost effective.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose Jane and John are both convicted of child abuse in Los
Angeles, California and are both sentenced on the same day to one
year in the county jail. Jane is housed in the women's unit and John
in the men's unit. According to current policies, Jane will remain in
jail for the entire year, while John will serve only six months of his
sentence.' Jane will serve double the amount of time that John will
solely on account of her gender.
1. Telephone Interview with Source 1, in L.A., Cal. (Feb. 12,2007) (notes on file with
author); Telephone Interview by Union Rescue Mission with Source 2, in LA., Cal. (Feb. 27,
2007) (notes on file with author) (discussing Los Angeles County policy as of February 5,
2007 that requires male inmates to serve fifty percent of their time for child abuse, while
women serve one hundred percent). Note that throughout the Article, interview sources'
names have been converted to numbers for anonymity.
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What if, instead, they are both convicted of assault and sen-
tenced on the same day to one year in jail? In this case, Jane will be
released in just over a month, while John will remain in jail for six
months2 - again solely due to gender. If they are convicted in Detroit,
Michigan, on the other hand, it is very likely that John will serve a
much shorter percentage of his sentence than Jane because the county
jail is so overcrowded with male inmates.3 But if they are convicted
in Calaveras County, California, Jane will most likely not serve any
of her sentence because the jail has very few beds for women, while
John will remain incarcerated for a much longer portion of his sen-
tence.4 As these examples illustrate, men and women frequently serve
different portions of their sentences solely because of their gender.
Is this sex discrimination that violates the Equal Protection Clause?5
For decades, jail officials around the country have released some
inmates before their sentences ended in order to relieve overcrowd-
ing and satisfy budget constraints.6 But because men and women are
typically held in separate quarters, jail officials have employed early
release policies that differ by gender - even when the inmates have
been convicted of the same crimes.7 These policies can fluctuate day
by day, depending on the number of arrests made and the amount of
correctional space available for each sex.'
2. Telephone Interview with Source 1, supra note 1. In February 2007, the Los
Angeles Sheriffs Department ordered that all male inmates, no matter what their crime,
be released after serving fifty percent of their sentences, except for those men with gang
injunctions, who must serve one hundred percent of their time. Telephone Interview with
Source 2, supra note 1; see also Stuart Pfeifer, Terms Differ in Jail Releases, L.A. TIMES,
May 29, 2006, at Al (discussing the L.A. County Sheriffs policy of having gang members
serve full sentences for any crime, when others are released early due to overcrowding).
On the other hand, the early release of women, who are housed in a separate facility, is
regulated by a separate, sliding scale system where offenders are released early depending
on the crime committed and how crowded the jail is. Pfeifer, supra; Telephone Interview
with Source 1, supra note 1. The Sheriffs Department implemented these separate policies
because of differences in overcrowding in the men's and women's facilities. Telephone
Interview with Source 2, supra note 1.
3. Telephone Interview with Source 3, in Wayne County, Mich. (Feb. 20, 2007) (notes
on file with author).
4. Telephone Interview with Source 4, in Calaveras County, Cal. (Feb. 9, 2007) (notes
on file with author).
5. See Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.comlposts/
1149116080.shtml (May 31, 2006, 18:54 EST) (discussing whether gender-based release
policies of Los Angeles County, California violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Federal Constitution).
6. See, e.g., Pfeifer, supra note 2 (discussing longstanding jail overcrowding issues
in Los Angeles County, California); Telephone Interview with Source 3, supra note 3
(stating that the Wayne County jails are "systemically overcrowded" and that they have
been under a court order to early release prisoners since 1991).
7. See, e.g., Pfeifer, supra note 2; Telephone Interview with Source 1, supra note 1;
Telephone Interview with Source 2, supra note 1.
8. Telephone Interview with Source 4, supra note 4; Telephone Interview with
Source 5, in Larimer County, Colo. (Jan. 29, 2007) (notes on file with author); Telephone
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It is constitutional to segregate correctional facilities by sex,9
even though it is clearly a gender-based classification, as it serves
important and legitimate government interests, including improved
discipline within penal facilities and increased safety for female in-
mates.10 But that does not mean it is constitutional to release male
and female inmates on different schedules depending on overcrowding
in each sex-segregated section."1 The United States Supreme Court
has not directly addressed this problem, and lower federal court de-
cisions have only touched on it.' 2 Lower federal court cases focusing
on the constitutionality of unequal prison programming offerings 3
by gender have often determined that male and female inmates were
not "similarly situated," due to differences such as size of male and
female prison populations and security levels within the prisons. 4
When these cases did evaluate such differences, they generally found
that the classifications were gender neutral, because they were made
by prison administrators using their discretion to meet the varying
needs of their prison populations, rather than explicitly by gender.i"
Under the rational basis test, courts have found these programming
differences to be constitutional.' 6 Furthermore, courts have been reti-
cent to closely scrutinize the decisions of prison administrators since
the Supreme Court counseled against it in Turner v. Safley. 17
Interview with Source 6, in Marion County, Or. (Jan. 29, 2007) (notes on file with
author); Telephone Interview with Source 7, in Santa Barbara, Cal. (Feb. 9, 2007) (notes
on file with author); Telephone Interview with Source 1, supra note 1; Telephone Interview
with Source 3, supra note 3.
9. Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep't of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 926
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
10. See Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 920,929,932 (discussing the district court's con-
clusions that the prison had violated a D.C. law which required that prison adminis-
trators be responsible for the discipline and safekeeping of all prisoners and that the
administration's response to the problem of sexual harassment of women prisoners by
guards was inadequate); Volokh, supra note 5.
11. Pfeifer, supra note 2; Volokh, supra note 5.
12. See Volokh, supra note 5 (citing the circuit court case, Jackson v. Thornburgh,
907 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1990), as the only case Professor Volokh found related to the
constitutionality of different release schedules for male and female inmates).
13. For example, in some prison systems male and female inmates have different access
to employment, educational programs, and recreational facilities. See, e.g., Keevan v.
Smith, 100 F.3d 644, 645, 647 (8th Cir. 1996) (dismissing an equal protection challenge
to prisons offering men a broader range of prison industry jobs and post-secondary
educational opportunities).
14. Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 924-26; Pargo v. Elliott, 894 F. Supp. 1243, 1259,
1261, 1264-65 (S.D. Iowa 1995), affd, 69 F.3d 280, 281 (8th Cir. 1995).
15. See, e.g., Pargo, 894 F. Supp. at 1258, 1265, 1291.
16. See, e.g., id. at 1264-65, 1290-91.
17. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,85 (1987); see, e.g., Klinger v. Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d
727, 732-33 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that "[blecause courts have little expertise in the
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In one case focusing on sex discrimination in early release poli-
cies, West v. Virginia Department of Corrections, the Western District
of Virginia determined that a male-only prison boot camp program
that enabled inmates to be released much earlier than their sentences
otherwise allowed was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause.'" The court reviewed the policy under intermediate scrutiny
and found that while the State's justifications of budget shortfalls
and greater overcrowding in the men's prisons were important state
interests, having a male-only boot camp was not substantially related
to those interests. 9 Conversely, in Jackson v. Thornburgh, the D.C.
Circuit reviewed an early release policy in D.C. jails that excluded
some of the city's female offenders because they were housed sepa-
rately in a West Virginia federal prison, due to overcrowding prob-
lems in the city's jails.2 ° The court found that because many of the
city's male inmates were also housed in federal prisons, and thus did
not receive the benefits of the policy while some female inmates did
benefit from the policy, it was not a sex-based classification.21 The
court thus reviewed the policy under rational basis review and found
it to have sufficient merit to pass the test.22
While a number of articles have studied gender differences in
prison programming, surprisingly, none address the constitutionality
of gender differences in early jail or prison release policies.23 Part I of
this Article will discuss the gender differences found in early release
policies in county jails in eight states.24 Some of these counties employ
'inordinately difficult' task of running prisons, courts should accord a high degree of
deference to prison authorities" (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 85)).
18. West v. Va. Dep't of Corr., 847 F. Supp. 402, 404, 406-08 (W.D. Va. 1994).
19. Id. at 406-08. More recently, "the Supreme Court has held that 'parties who seek
to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive'
justification for that action."' Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 459
F.3d 676, 692-93 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Virginia (VM!), 518 U.S. 515,
531 (1996)).
20. Jackson v. Thornburgh, 907 F.2d 194, 195-96 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
21. Id. at 197.
22. Id. at 195, 197-98; see also Pers. Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272
(1979) ("[I]f a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect upon [a protected group],
it is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause only if that impact can be traced
to a discriminatory purpose.").
23. See, e.g., Rosemary M. Kennedy, The Treatment of Women Prisoners After the
VMI Decision: Application of a New "Heightened Scrutiny," 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 65,
68-76 (1997); see also Volokh, supra note 5 (noting the absence of scholarly research on
differential early release policies).
24. Counties surveyed by telephone interview included Los Angeles County, Calaveras
County, and Santa Barbara County in California; Larimer County (Ft. Collins) in
Colorado; Marion County (Indianapolis) in Indiana; Washtenaw County (Ann Arbor) and
Wayne County (Detroit) in Michigan; Hamilton County (Cincinnati) in Ohio; Marion
County (Salem) and Multnomah County (Portland) in Oregon; Salt Lake County (Salt
Lake City) in Utah; and Milwaukee County in Wisconsin.
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different policies for inmates of each gender, like Los Angeles for ex-
ample,25 while most counties surveyed have one early release policy,
but apply it separately to male and female inmates depending on
which section of the jail is overcrowded.26 Part II analyzes the consti-
tutionality of jail early release policies that differ by gender. I start
by arguing that courts should follow the precedent established in
Johnson v. California and review gender-based equal protection
challenges under heightened scrutiny,2" rather than the deferential
"reasonably related" standard of Turner v. Safley.28 The section then
provides an equal protection analysis of the two early release policy
regimes. I argue that male and female inmates who are convicted of
the same crime and sentenced to the same amount of time in the
same county jail are similarly situated and should be compared
under the equal protection doctrine.
I then address whether early release policies should be viewed
as gender neutral, as the preference granted to veterans in hiring de-
cisions was in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,
meaning they must be evaluated under the rational basis review
standard, or whether they are gender-based classifications deserving
heightened scrutiny.29 I argue that these early release policies are,
in effect, gender-based classifications because of their perfect causal
relationship with the underlying policy of segregating inmates by sex.
Although early release policies may appear facially gender neutral,
in fact, they are not neutral as applied because they are based on the
permissible but sex-based policy of segregating inmates by gender.
This differs from the circumstances in Feeney, where the policy of
obtaining veteran status did not have a perfect causal relationship
with gender.3' In Part II, I also discuss case law involving the assign-
ment of public school sports seasons, because policies of scheduling
male and female sports teams into advantageous and disadvanta-
geous seasons is causally dependent upon the gender-based policy
of segregating teams by sex.3 Indeed, in these cases, courts have
25. Telephone Interview with Source 1, supra note 1; Telephone Interview with
Source 2, supra note 1 (explaining Los Angeles County policies as of February 5, 2007
that require male and female inmates to serve different amounts of their sentences for
the same crimes).
26. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Source 7, supra note 8 (explaining these
release policies work differently between men's and women's sections and that they
release early only if there is overcrowding in that section).
27. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509-12 (2005) (applying strict scrutiny to
race-based classifications).
28. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987).
29. See Pers. Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272-73, 275, 280 (1979).
30. See id. at 275-80.
31. See Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 459 F.3d 676,694-95 (6th
Cir. 2006).
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found policies of scheduling teams' seasons to be gender based,32 just
as the early release policies in jail should be seen as gender based.
As gender-based policies, the early release policies in some jails
should be evaluated under the intermediate scrutiny standard. Under
intermediate scrutiny analysis, county jail administrators could
assert a number of important state interests, including public safety
and overcrowding problems, as well as interests that have not been
deemed important in past cases like administrative efficiency and
cost effectiveness. I contend, however, that releasing men and women
differently by gender should not be found by courts as substantially
related to any of the important state interests.
In Part III, I argue that given the likely unconstitutionality of
these early release regimes, jail administrators should work to alter
them. A two-pronged, cost-effective, yet public safety oriented solution
would: (1) release more inmates early depending on their danger to
society via an inmate ranking system, and (2) include some jail ca-
pacity that is more easily redistributed between the sexes, such as
smaller pod units, to account for fluctuations. In order to cut down on
overcrowding as well as to promote enhanced prisoner reintegration,
counties should also embrace less costly, nonjail sentencing options
for nonviolent offenders, such as community-based reintegration
programs, work release, and electronic tethering.33
I. DIFFERENCES BY GENDER IN EARLY RELEASE POLICIES
Due to the overcrowding of many jails in the United States, jail
officials are often forced to release inmates earlier than their sen-
tences warrant. In some cases, county jails must release inmates early
due to court orders that the jails must not remain overcrowded, 34
while in others the lack of space absolutely requires it. 35 In any case,
it is often appointed administrators in a county sheriffs department,
32. Id. at 692-95.
33. See infra notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Source 4, supra note 4. In Calaveras County,
California, the County Board of Supervisors sued the Sheriff in 1999 to keep the jail
population down, because at that time the jail was so dangerously overcrowded that in-
mates were sleeping in the hallways. Id. A court order resulting from the lawsuit requires
the jail population to be kept at sixty five inmates or less, with a mandated proportion
of fifty-six males and nine females. Id.; see also Telephone Interview with Source 8, in
Hamilton County, Ohio (Feb. 20, 2007) (notes on file with author) (explaining early release
is practiced in order to comply with a court mandated jail population cap); Telephone
Interview with Source 9, in Salt Lake County, Utah (Feb. 27, 2007) (notes on file with
author) (explaining that the County Commission, rather than a court order, requires the
county to keep their jail population down).
35. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Source 7, supra note 8 (noting "kick lists" are
run when inmates are sleeping on the floor).
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rather than judges or elected officials, who determine who gets re-
leased early.36
In nearly all jails, men and women are held in different jail sec-
tions, and thus the rates of overcrowding between men and women
often differ.37 Regulations in many locales ensure that women and
men are kept apart and are not within "sight" or "sound" of each
other.3" Women are housed apart from the men in separate jail wings
or "blocks," 9 on different floors,' ° in separate dormitories,4' or in
"pods" segregated by gender.42
Rates of overcrowding often fluctuate in the men's and women's
jail units due to differences over time in arrests, sentencing, and in-
mate behavior.43 In some jails, the number of cells assigned to each
gender does not match up with the regular numbers of inmates of
each gender, so one gender's cells may be overcrowded while the other
gender's are not.44 For example, some older jails were built to house
few women based on the limited need for beds at the time of con-
struction, but in more recent years as the number of women held and
sentenced to jails has increased, overcrowding of women's beds has
increased.45 In order to solve this problem, some locales have restruc-
tured their jails or repurposed men's cells to house women.46 A few
36. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Source 3, supra note 3 (stating a court order
specifically delegates early release authority); Telephone Interview with Source 10, in
Multnomah County, Or. (Feb. 12, 2007) (notes on file with author) (describing their
Emergency Population Release (EPR) matrix which involves discretion in classification
at intake).
37. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Source 3, supra note 3 (noting women in this
county are less likely to get early release because of less overcrowding than in the men's
section); Telephone Interview with Source 5, supra note 8; Telephone Interview with
Source 6, supra note 8. This differs from prisons, which mostly consist entirely of either
men or women.
38. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Source 5, supra note 8; Telephone Interview
with Source 6, supra note 8.
39. Telephone Interview with Source 11, in Washtenaw County, Mich. (Feb. 20,2007)
(notes on file with author).
40. Telephone Interview with Source 5, supra note 8.
41. Telephone Interview with Source 12, in Milwaukee, Wis. (Feb. 13, 2007) (notes on
file with author).
42. A "pod" jail structure is one in which inmates spend their time in a day room
surrounded by a number of jail cells that fan out like the rays around the sun. Telephone
Interview with Source 6, supra note 8. A guard can see into every jail cell by standing
in the middle of the day room. Telephone Interview with Source 11, supra note 39.
43. Telephone Interview with Source 5, supra note 8; Telephone Interview with
Source 11, supra note 39.
44. Telephone Interview with Source 4, supra note 4; Telephone Interview with
Source 6, supra note 8.
45. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Source 8, supra note 34; Telephone Interview
with Source 13, in Marion County, Ind. (Feb. 13, 2007) (notes on file with author). For
example, in Calaveras County, California the women's beds in the jail are always over-
crowded. See Telephone Interview with Source 4, supra note 4.
46. E.g., Telephone Interview with Source 6, supra note 8.
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jails have smaller housing units that they are able to reassign be-
tween genders depending on crowding needs,47 but many jails have
not taken such measures. As men and women are held in separate
sections of jails which are frequently overcrowded at different rates,
many jails have early release policies that result in the release of men
and women with similar sentences at different points in their sen-
tences.' This difference between the amount of a sentence served by
men and women varies considerably across jurisdictions and could be
a matter of days, months, or even years.49
There are two types of early release policies that treat male and
female inmates differently - those that are explicitly gender based
and those that are facially neutral but cause disparate effects on men
and women. Some county jails explicitly vary their early release pol-
icies by gender. For example, in Cincinnati, Ohio, the population of
the Hamilton County Justice Center, the county's primary jail, is
capped by court order at 1,240 inmates. 0 When the county releases
inmates early, on average once a month, it "almost always only re-
lease[s] women," because "the jail [was] not built to house as many
women" as are now being sentenced to the jail.51 When the jail's in-
mate numbers surge over 1,240, jail administrators "begin by releas-
ing non-violent female offenders after ninety percent of their time
is served."52 If that does not sufficiently reduce the numbers, they
then release nonviolent female offenders who have served eighty per-
cent of their time.53 The county continues this downward process to
those who have served seventy percent, then sixty percent, and so
forth, until the population has been appropriately lowered. 4 When
all but the violent female offenders are released, the system shifts
47. Telephone Interview with Source 10, supra note 36 ("[The jail] can reassign units
between women's and men's jails pretty easily. If a women's pod is open, they can assign
men to it."); see also Telephone Interview with Source 8, supra note 34 (describing how
pods are "[c]onstantly shifting" once emptied by weekly early releases); Telephone Inter-
view with Source 11, supra note 39 (stating the sheriff can reassign cell blocks).
48. In my survey of county jails in eight states, the majority of sheriffs departments
that responded to my contact - and reported overcrowding problems - employed early
release policies that treated men and women differently. For a list of responsive counties,
see supra note 24.
49. Most of these jails hold inmates up to one year or less. See, e.g., Telephone Inter-
view with Source 7, supra note 8; Telephone Interview with Source 6, supra note 8;
Telephone Interview with Source 10, supra note 36. When inmates are sentenced to more
than one year, they are typically sent to state prison. But some jails allow inmates to be
sentenced for up to two years if they are consecutively sentenced for two separate vio-
lations. E.g., Telephone Interview with Source 7, supra note 8.
50. Telephone Interview with Source 8, supra note 34.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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to releasing males.55 Male nonviolent offenders who have served
ninety percent of their time are sometimes, but rarely, released under
this system, because the jail first moves men into the units formerly
occupied by women.56
In the chronically overcrowded Los Angeles County jail system,
more than 150,000 inmates have been released early since major sher-
iff department budget cuts in 2002."7 Recently, the sheriffs depart-
ment ordered that all male inmates, no matter what their crime, will
be released after serving fifty percent of their sentences,5" except for
those men with gang injunctions, who will serve one hundred percent
of their time.59 The early release of women, who are housed in a sepa-
rate facility, is regulated by a separate system of "daily criteria."6
In this system, female offenders are released early on a sliding scale,
depending on the seriousness of the crime committed and how crowded
the jail is at the time.6' Currently, female nonviolent offenders, such
as petty thieves and drunk drivers, serve ten percent or less of their
jail sentences, while those sentenced for the most serious crimes,
such as manslaughter, child molestation, and conspiracy to commit
murder, serve one hundred percent of their sentences."
Counties employing overtly gender-based policies stand in con-
trast to counties that apply the same early release policy differently
to male and female inmates depending on which section of the jail is
overcrowded. While nearly every jail that conducts early release has
some system of releasing those it deems less dangerous first, each
gender is dealt with separately with regard to such policies.63 For
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Jack Leonard et. al., Releasing Inmates Early Has a Costly Human Toll, L.A.
TIMES, May 14,2006, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-jail 14may14,
0,1011718.story?page=l; see also Pfeifer, supra note 2. When faced with budget cuts in
2002, Sheriff Lee Baca chose to decrease funding for jails rather than for patrol officers.
Leonard, supra.
58. Telephone Interview with Source 1, supra note 1; Telephone Interview with Source
2, supra note 1. The Los Angeles County sheriff began this new policy on February 5,
2007. Telephone Interview with Source 2, supra note 1.
59. Id.
60. Telephone Interview with Source 1, supra note 1.
61. Id.
62. Id.; Telephone Interview with Source 2, supra note 1. In earlier years, the "daily
criteria" system was applied to both men and women in the Los Angeles jails, but applied
differently due to space constraints and arrest fluctuations between the genders. Id. For
example, from 2005 to 2006, women convicted of assault served twenty-five percent of
their sentences, while men convicted of assault served only ten percent. Pfeifer, supra
note 2. Conversely, in 2004, "women convicted of all but the most serious crimes were
released immediately" and spent no time in jail. Id. In the last four years, the sheriffs
department has held those inmates deemed the most chronic, dangerous offenders, like
prostitutes from certain areas and gang members, for their entire sentences. Id.
63. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Source 13, supra note 45.
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example, in one of the largest jails in Oregon, Marion County Jail
administrators have created a capacity management plan, which
scores each inmate based on criminal history, current charge, and
current and past behavior.6' In Detroit, Michigan the chronically
overcrowded Wayne County jails use a similar classification system
to release the least dangerous jail inmates early.65 Each morning,
the Marion County Jail Commander and the Wayne County Chief of
Jails receive two scored lists, one for their male inmates and one for
female inmates.6 6 After determining that their jails are overcrowded
(which they typically are), they begin by releasing those with the
lowest scores who are deemed the least dangerous according to their
lists until their jails are not overcrowded anymore.6"
On average, about ten inmates a day are released in Marion
County and nearly twenty in Wayne County. However, in both
counties, they will only release inmates of each gender if their units
are overcrowded.69 In Wayne County, the men's units are generally
much more overcrowded than the women's units and so more men are
released early, ° whereas in Marion County the women's units have
historically been more crowded and so more women have been re-
leased early.7' In recent years in Marion County, before the county
changed a twenty-four-bed pod from the men's unit to the women's
unit, female inmates were "constantly being released from the list"
due to overcrowding, while men were not released early nearly as
frequently.72
Similarly, in the much smaller Calaveras County Jail, which
houses fifty-six males and nine females, jail administrators devised
an early release plan to release the least dangerous inmates first.73
Each morning a designated jail officer creates one "kick list" for men
and another for women, beginning with inmates who have committed
nonviolent misdemeanors, and ending with those who have committed
64. Telephone Interview with Source 6, supra note 8.
65. Telephone Interview with Source 3, supra note 3 (stating pursuant to a 1991 court
order, Wayne County developed an "objective classification plan... based on" the severity
of crime, prior criminal history, and thirty additional factors).
66. Telephone Interview with Source 6, supra note 8; see Telephone Interview with
Source 3, supra note 3.
67. Telephone Interview with Source 3, supra note 3; Telephone Interview with
Source 6, supra note 8.
68. Telephone Interview with Source 6, supra note 8; see Telephone Interview with
Source 3, supra note 3.
69. Telephone Interview with Source 6, supra note 8; see Telephone Interview with
Source 3, supra note 3.
70. Telephone Interview with Source 3, supra note 3.
71. Telephone Interview with Source 6, supra note 8.
72. Id.
73. Telephone Interview with Source 4, supra note 4.
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violent felonies, when necessary.74 The jail has significantly fewer
beds for women, so it releases early many more women than men who
have committed similar offenses.75 In fact, on a half dozen occasions
in 2006 and 2007, convicted nonviolent female felons did not serve
any of their sentence due to the overcrowding in the women's unit of
the jail, and some women were released almost two years early.76 Men
with similar sentences, however, served a much larger percentage of
their time.77 Similarly, in 2005 and 2006, the jail in Marion County,
Indiana regularly released groups of less-dangerous women inmates
due to overcrowding in the women's jail without releasing groups of
similar men.78
Other jail systems, like the Santa Barbara County Jail, begin by
releasing early inmates who are closest to finishing their sentences,
although those who have committed certain, dangerous crimes are
not eligible.79 The Population Control Officer regularly releases
inmates up to twenty-one days before their sentences are completed,
but conducts the procedure separately for men and women." If there
is no overcrowding in the women's facility, then no women are re-
leased even though all men with twenty-one days or less to serve
are released.8 '
Other jail systems release early inmates by crime and by time
left in their sentence. In Portland, Oregon, the Multnomah County
Jails score each inmate based on factors that help determine their
dangerousness to society, and thus release inmates primarily based
on how dangerous the crime they committed is thought to be by ad-
ministrators. 2 Specifically, inmates are released first based on the
dangerousness of the crime they committed, and second according
to their time left to serve. 3 Due to overcrowding, men who commit
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. See Telephone Interview with Source 13, supra note 45.
79. Telephone Interview with Source 7, supra note 8. A list of 150 crimes that are not
eligible for early release, such as spousal battery and certain other felonies, was assembled
by a jail task force, comprised of individuals from the jails, the courts, the police, and the
ACLU, among others. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. For example, according to Source 7, on February 9, 2007, there was no over-
crowding in the women's units in the Santa Barbara County Jail, but there was for the
men. Id. Consequently, "he instated twenty-one day kicks" to release all men (except for
those who committed any of the 150 ineligible charges) who had twenty-one or fewer
days remaining to serve, but did not release any women early that day. Id.
82. Telephone Interview with Source 10, supra note 36.
83. Id. The type of crime committed is the most important factor in the county's early
release policy. Id. "[Flor example[,] if a wife beater only has a few days left [to serve] and
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misdemeanors almost never have to serve any of their jail time.'
Like systems in other counties, this policy is applied by gender and
employed only when a section is overcrowded. 5 The women's unit
is much less crowded than the men's, so as a result, women have not
been released early for the past two years, while men are regularly
released early.86
II. ARE UNEQUAL EARLY RELEASE POLICIES UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
In order to determine whether it is constitutional to apply early
release policies differently to male and female inmates with similar
sentences because of differences in overcrowding, several steps must
be taken. First, one must determine whether the courts should apply
the deferential standard toward administrators of jails and prisons
set forth in Turner v. Safley" or whether instead courts should em-
ploy the intermediate scrutiny standard of review that is typical of
sex discrimination claims and seems to be required by Johnson v.
California."8
A. Should the Turner Standard of Deference be Applied?
While Turner lowered the standard of review for some challenges
brought by inmates based on constitutional rights, 9 and lower courts
have applied it in their review of some sex discrimination cases under
the Equal Protection Clause,9" the Supreme Court's 2005 ruling in
Johnson has likely forbidden such application of Turner.91 In Turner,
the Court held that when evaluating whether a prison regulation
violates inmates' constitutional rights, courts must defer to prison
officials to make "day-to-day judgments" concerning the operations
a guy.., who stole a car" just arrived, Multnomah County "would let out the car thief
first." Id.
84. See id. Thus, the jail is typically full of felons.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987).
88. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509-12 (2005) (rejecting the Turner
deferential standard when considering an equal protection challenge to racially based
classifications in prisons and reiterating the universal application of strict scrutiny for
race-based classifications).
89. Turner, 482 U.S. at 78, 89.
90. E.g., Klinger v. Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d 727, 730-33 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Keevan
v. Smith, 100 F.3d 644, 645, 649-50 (8th Cir. 1996); Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep't of
Corr. v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 926-27 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Pargo v. Elliott, 894
F. Supp. 1243, 1264-65 (S.D. Iowa 1995), affid, 69 F.3d 280, 281 (8th Cir. 1995).
91. See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 509-12.
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of their institutions.92 The Court held that judicial micromanaging
of prison officials' decisions "distort[s] the decisionmaking process,"
impedes the ability of officials to "adopt innovative solutions," and
"would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security prob-
lems." 93 Turner instead set forth a low standard for evaluating the
constitutionality of inmates' claims, holding that a "regulation is valid
if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."94
In Washington v. Harper, the Supreme Court found that the stan-
dard of review set forth in Turner "appl[ied] in all cases in which a
prisoner asserts that a prison regulation violates the Constitution."95
The Court noted that "[t]his is true even when the constitutional right
claimed to have been infringed is fundamental, and the State under
other circumstances would have been required to satisfy a more rig-
orous standard of review."96 More recently, however, the Supreme
Court held in Johnson that the strict scrutiny standard, rather than
Turner's reasonably related standard, applied to an equal protection
challenge brought by an inmate on the basis of race.97 The Court
found that "[tihe right not to be discriminated against based on one's
race is not susceptible to the logic of Turner.""9 The Court held that
"Turner's reasonable-relationship test" should be applied only "to
rights that are 'inconsistent with proper incarceration,"' and "[t]he
right not to be discriminated against based on one's race" does not
"necessarily [need to] be compromised for the sake of proper prison
administration." 99
Following Johnson, courts should similarly find that the right not
to be discriminated against based on one's sex in early release policies
92. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (citing Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128
(1977)).
93. Id. at 89.
94. Id. Turner set forth several factors for a court to consider when determining the
reasonableness of a challenged prison regulation. "First, there must be a 'valid, rational
connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put
forward to justify it." Id. at 89 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
So, the logical connection between the policy and objective cannot be too remote and "the
governmental objective must be a legitimate and neutral one." Id. at 89-90. Second, the
court must determine "whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that
remain open to prison inmates." Id. at 90. Third, the court must consider "the impact
accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other in-
mates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally." Id. Fourth, "the absence of
ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation." Id.
95. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223-24 (1990).
96. Id. at 223.
97. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509-10 (2005). Johnson challenged the
California Department of Correction's "unwritten policy of racially segregating prisoners
in double cells in reception centers for up to 60 days each time they enter[ed] a new
correctional facility." Id. at 502.
98. Id. at 510.
99. Id. (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003)).
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should not be evaluated under the low Turner standard.°0 While the
Johnson Court explicitly addressed only racial classifications in the
language of the opinion,'' courts going forward should analogize the
similarities of claims of race- and sex-based discrimination claims
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.° 2 Like
race-based discrimination, sex-based discrimination claims under
the Equal Protection Clause have long been deemed by the Court to
require heightened scrutiny, °3 "even for. . . 'benign'. . . classifica-
tions."' 4 Classifications based on sex, like those based on race, also
"raise special fears that they are motivated by an invidious purpose,"
and heightened scrutiny is applied in those cases, as it is in racial
cases, "to 'smoke out' illegitimate" notions of sexism by requiring the
state to have an important purpose for using the classification. 10
In applying the standard from Johnson to gender-based discrim-
ination policies, the right to be free from gender discrimination while
incarcerated - like the right to be free from race discrimination -
does not seem "inconsistent with proper incarceration" and does not
necessarily need to be "compromised for the sake of proper prison
administration."' Gender-neutral early release policies are possible
and, in fact, some counties employ such regulations.0 7 Accordingly,
there are certainly methods to insure against dangerous criminals get-
ting back out onto the streets other than using a sex-based approach.
Further, the race-based policy in California of selecting prison
roommates, at issue in Johnson, more typically falls under the his-
torical purview of Turner, even though the Court refused to apply
100. See id. at 509-10. But if courts do not see such an analogy to Johnson, the pro-
cedures of jail administrators of applying early release policies differently to female and
male inmates due to different overcrowding concerns likely would be upheld under the
very deferential Thrner standard. Courts likely would find that the policies are reasonably
related to the legitimate penological interest of reducing overcrowding, while ensuring
the public's safety because gender equal policies could result in inmates being released
early despite available jail beds.
101. See id. at 505-15.
102. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 489-90
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating intermediate scrutiny is required for gender-
based equal protection analysis and that the government bears the burden of proving the
"importance of its... objective and the substantial relationship between the classification
and that objective" and suggesting California's policy should have failed this constitutional
test) (citations omitted).
103. Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450, 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
104. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003))
(referring to racial classifications).
105. Id. at 506 (quoting Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)) (refer-
ring to racial classifications).
106. Id. at 510.
107. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Source 5, supra note 8 (stating all inmates
except the most dangerous are released after serving seventy-five percent of their
sentences regardless of gender).
2009] 605
606 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 15:591
that standard, 0 8 whereas early release policies do not. The selection
of roommates is a day-to-day operational concern that deals with the
control of inmate behavior within the confines of the institutional
environment.109 Early release policies, on the other hand, are not re-
lated to controlling inmates day-to-day within the jail's confines, but
instead deal with much broader policy choices of sentence length and
the curtailment of individual liberty."0 Such policies have not been
clearly regulated by Turner."'
In fact, in other pre-Johnson sex discrimination cases that focus
on disparate early release policies between male and female inmates,
as well as the placement of inmates in separate facilities by gender,
courts have not applied Turner, but instead employed an equal pro-
tection analysis. '12 For example, in Pitts v. Thornburgh, where women
sued for being sentenced to a far away federal facility, the D.C. Circuit
chose not to apply the Turner standard because the policy was not a
day-to-day restriction on "the exercise of prisoners' individual rights
within prisons," but a "general budgetary and policy choice[] made
over decades in the give and take of city politics."'18 Early release
policies are similarly policy choices made due to budget shortages
that are also often due to county politics.'14
The court in West v. Virginia Department of Corrections ruled
that the deference to prison administrators in Turner does not apply
"when an extremely favorable sentencing alternative is" afforded to
one gender, but not the other."5 Gender-based early jail release poli-
cies often shorten the sentences of members of one sex but not the
other. The lower courts that have applied Turner to inmate sex dis-
crimination claims were typically dealing with differences in prison
108. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 510 (holding that when roommate selection is based on race,
it is a racial classification and Turner's deferential standard does not apply).
109. See Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450, 1453-54 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Schwartz v.
Dennison, 518 F. Supp. 2d 560, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Klos v. Haskell, 48 F.3d 81,
87 (1995)).
110. See Pitts, 866 F.2d at 1453-54; Schwartz, 518 F. Supp. 2d at 576-77.
111. See, e.g., Pitts, 866 F.2d at 1453-54 (distinguishing Turner's day-to-day regulations
from broader policy decisions over long periods of time and subject to system wide budget-
ary constraints).
112. See id. at 1454.
113. Id. at 1453-54 (holding instead that Turner applies to prison procedures that regu-
late day-to-day operations, such as "prison security or control of inmate behavior... [or]
the prison environment and regime").
114. Id. at 1454.
115. West v. Va. Dep't of Corr., 847 F. Supp. 402, 408 (W.D. Va. 1994) (stating "when
an extremely favorable sentencing alternative is provided to one class of inmates and not
another, and when that classification is based solely on the inmates' gender, the line [of
deference to prison administrators in their operations of the prison system] is crossed").
Additionally, the D.C. Circuit had previously found that Turner's lower standard of reason-
ableness does not apply to "general budgetary and policy choices made over decades in
the give and take of city politics." Pitts, 866 F.2d at 1454.
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and jail programming.'16 Thus, the lower standard of review required
by Turner should not apply to early jail release policies; they should
instead be evaluated by courts using an equal protection analysis
similar to that used in Johnson, Pitts, and West.
B. Are Male and Female Inmates Similarly Situated in Regard to
Jail Early Release Policies?
Courts must first determine whether men and women are "simi-
larly situated" in the context in which they are being compared to
determine whether any differences in their treatment should be eval-
uated under the Equal Protection Clause." 7 While classifications by
gender often contravene the Constitution, there are cases when they
do not, because "there are differences between males and females that
the Constitution necessarily recognizes. ' The government's "[t]reat-
ment of dissimilarly situated persons in a dissimilar manner.., does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause.""11
9
For example, in Michael M. v. Sonoma County, the Court held
that because women can become pregnant through intercourse but
men cannot, the two genders were not similarly situated with regard
to a statutory rape statute. 20 In these "narrow circumstances," the
Court has found that "men and women are not similarly situated; in
these circumstances a gender classification based on clear differences
between the sexes is not invidious, and a legislative classification
realistically based upon those differences is not unconstitutional."'
2
'
The few courts that have handled cases alleging sex discrimina-
tion in early release policies have deemed that male and female in-
mates are similarly situated. 2 2 In West, the Court found male and
116. See, e.g., Keevan v. Smith, 100 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 1996); Women Prisoners of D.C.
Dep't of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Klinger v. Dep't of
Corr., 31 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1994); Pargo v. Elliott, 894 F. Supp. 1243 (S.D. Iowa 1995),
affd, 69 F.3d 280, 281 (8th Cir. 1995).
117. Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464,478 (1981) (Stewart,
J., concurring) (stating that if men and women are deemed not to be similarly situated
in the context in which they are being compared, then the court will not review the sex
discrimination case under intermediate scrutiny); Klinger, 31 F.3d at 731.
118. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 478 (Stewart, J., concurring).
119. Keevan, 100 F.3d at 648.
120. Michael M, 450 U.S. at 478-79 (Stewart, J., concurring). Similarly, the Court in
Rostker v. Goldberg and Schlesinger v. Ballard held that women and men were not
similarly situated with regard to combat and draft registration. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.S. 57, 78 (1981); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975).
121. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 478. After making this determination, the Michael M.
Court did, however, apply intermediate scrutiny and found that the statute passed the
standard. See id. at 472-74.
122. See, e.g., Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep't of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d
910, 924-26 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
20091
608 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 15:591
female inmates similarly situated for the purpose of an equal protec-
tion challenge to the exclusion of females from a boot camp program
that allowed male participants to be released years earlier than their
sentences prescribed.'23 The court found that no "acknowledged dif-
ferences" between men and women justified offering the boot camp
to men but not women.'24 In Jackson v. Thornburgh, a case challeng-
ing the unavailability of early release policies to long-term female in-
mates, the D.C. Circuit found that men and women in separate facil-
ities who were serving similar amounts of time were also similarly
situated.125
In cases challenging prison programming as discriminatory based
on sex, courts have ruled both ways. The Eighth and D.C. Circuits
have held that male and female inmates who are lodged in different
facilities are not necessarily similarly situated,'26 while other courts
have made the opposite finding.'27 For example, in Keevan v. Smith,
the court found that female and male inmates were not similarly situ-
ated when evaluating their access to educational and employment
programs, because women comprised a small percentage of the in-
mate population, their facilities were smaller in size, their average
security classification level was lower, and their average sentence
length was much shorter than for males. '28 The court found that prison
123. See West v. Va. Dep't of Corr., 847 F. Supp. 402, 404, 406-08 (W.D. Va. 1994). One
"real couple ... was illustrative of th[e] disparity." Id. at 404, n.4. "[Tihe couple [was]
charged at the same time with the same offense, in the same court, before the same judge,
and were prosecuted by the same prosecutor." Id. "Counsel for both defendants requested
assignment" to the boot camp, but because the boot camp was only available for men, the
boyfriend was sentenced to the boot camp, while the girlfriend was "sentenced... to the
next best thing: twenty years in the Community Diversion Incentive Program." Id. If the
boyfriend successfully completed the program, he would be released at least eighteen
years earlier than his girlfriend. Id.
124. Id. at 408.
125. Jackson v. Thornburgh, 907 F.2d 194, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In fact, the court did
not even overtly address the similarly situated issue, and jumped right into its equal pro-
tection analysis, though the court ultimately rejected a heightened scrutiny standard.
Id. at 196-97; see also Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating
that female and male prisoners were similarly situated for purposes of a challenge to a
gender-based rule specifying that long-term women prisoners be held in a facility much
further away from the District than men convicted of similar crimes).
126. See, e.g., Keevan v. Smith, 100 F.3d 644, 649 (8th Cir. 1996); Women Prisoners,
93 F.3d at 924-25.
127. See, e.g., Glover v. Johnson, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1015 (E.D. Mich. 1999); Canterino
v. Wilson, 546 F. Supp. 174, 206 (W.D. Ky. 1982).
128. Keevan, 100 F.3d at 648-49. In Keevan, female prisoners claimed that the Missouri
Department of Corrections violated the Equal Protection Clause by failing to grant them
the same access to education programs and prison employment that was provided to male
inmates. Id. at 645; accord Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 924-27; Klinger v. Dep't of Corr.,
31 F.3d 727, 731-32 (8th Cir. 1994); Pargo v. Elliott, 894 F. Supp. 1243, 1261 (S.D. Iowa
1995), affd, 69 F.3d 280, 281 (8th Cir. 1995).
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officials at each facility "'must balance"' the various characteristics of
their prisons and inmates in determining the programming to make
available. 129 As female and male prisoners were not similarly situ-
ated, the officials did not have to provide equal programming to each
gender. 3 ° Conversely, in McCoy v. Nevada Department of Corrections,
the district court found that women incarcerated at the Nevada
Women's Correctional Center were similarly situated to the men in
other Nevada correctional facilities when reviewing a challenge to
unequal programming between the women's and men's facilities.'
In regard to challenges to jail early release policies, courts would
likely rule that male and female inmates are similarly situated. As
in West, individuals who committed similar crimes in the same county
and received similar sentences, and only differ by sex, seem similarly
situated when evaluating the constitutionality of gender-based early
release policies.3 2 As in West and Jackson, and unlike in Michael M.,
there do not seem to be any "acknowledged differences" between men
and women that would justify different early release policies.'33 Cases
about early release policies seem less similar to the unequal program-
ming cases, because the primary argument for why women and men
are not similarly situated in those cases is that the different charac-
teristics of male and female prison populations, as groups, require dif-
ferent programming.' 4 This logic does not apply in the case of jail
early release policies, because such policies are applied not because
the male and female populations have different characteristics, but
because of different rates of overcrowding.'35 Furthermore, because
early release policies differentially affect individual inmates, no
129. Keevan, 100 F.3d at 649 (quoting Klinger, 31 F.3d at 732).
130. Id. at 649-50. The Eighth Circuit took into account factors such as size of prison
population, average sentence length, security classification, and types of crimes committed
between male and female inmates. Id. at 649.
131. See McCoy v. Nev. Dep't. of Prisons, 776 F. Supp. 521, 522-23 (D. Nev. 1991); see
also Wiley v. Trapp, No. 03-4133, 2004 WL 2011453 at *3 (D. Kan. Aug. 16, 2004) (finding
that female and male work release inmates were similarly situated because they were
"incarcerated in the same prison, had the same security level, committed the same types
of crimes and were serving similar sentences"); Glover, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1015 (finding
that, despite the recent Klinger and Women Prisoners cases, male and female inmates
housed separately would continue to be treated as similarly situated when evaluating
gender-based programming challenges); Canterino, 546 F. Supp. at 207-08 (finding that
male and female inmates housed separately are similarly situated and explicitly rejecting
administrators' claims that the different programming was justified by the smaller size,
security needs, and interests of the population at the female institution).
132. See West v. Va. Dep't of Corr., 847 F. Supp. 402, 404 (W.D. Va. 1994).
133. See Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1981);
West, 847 F. Supp. at 408; Jackson v. Thornburgh, 907 F.2d 194, 195-97 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
134. See supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., West, 847 F. Supp. at 406-07; see also Jackson, 907 F.2d at 195-98.
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argument about their characteristics as a group can apply."3 6 Thus,
in early release cases, males and females should be found to be simi-
larly situated, and courts should then continue with their equal pro-
tection analysis.
C. Gender-Neutral Versus Gender-Based Classification
1. Supreme Court Standards
While the Constitution does not explicitly protect citizens from sex
discrimination, the Supreme Court has found the Equal Protection
Clause does.'37 In reviewing a sex discrimination claim under the
Equal Protection Clause, if a policy under review for sex discrimi-
nation is deemed to be "gender-based," then courts will apply the
intermediate scrutiny standard.'38 In order to survive intermediate
scrutiny under an Equal Protection Clause analysis, a challenged
gender-based classification must serve "exceedingly persuasive" gov-
ernmental objectives and "[t]he State must show... 'that the discrimi-
natory means employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives."" 39 Conversely, if a state's classification is found
136. See Jackson, 907 F.2d at 197 (noting that because some women did, in fact, benefit
from the District's early release statute, while some men did not, gender classification
was not directly causing the disparate aggregate effects).
137. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. (emphasis added); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971).
138. United States v. Virginia (VMi), 518 U.S. 515, 531-33, 555 (1996); West, 847 F.
Supp. at 405. To be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating the Fourteenth Amendment,
an entity must be considered a "state actor." Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch.
Athletic Ass'n (MHSAA), 459 F.3d 676, 691 (6th Cir. 2006). In United States v. Virginia,
the sex-based classification at issue was the categorical exclusion of girls from the
publically funded Virginia Military Institute, while providing a sub-par institute for
females. VMI, 518 U.S. at 515-18. In Craig v. Boren, an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the
sale of 3.2% beer to males under age twenty-one, but only to females under age eighteen
was at issue. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 190-92 (1976). In Frontiero v. Richardson, at
issue were federal statutes requiring uniformed servicewomen to prove that their husbands
were dependent on them for more than half of their support in order to obtain certain bene-
fits, whereas uniformed servicemen were not required to prove similar dependency of their
wives to obtain the same benefits. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678-79 (1973).
139. VMI, 518 U.S. at 533 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
(1982)). In many state courts, however, "sex discrimination is usually treated as seriously
as racial discrimination." JENNIFER FRIESEN, 1 STATE CONSTITuTIoNAL LAW: LITIGATING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES § 3.01[1] (4th ed. 2006). Unlike the federal
courts' application of intermediate scrutiny, most states that have decided the issue apply
a strict scrutiny standard when evaluating sex-based classifications. Id. § 302[5][a].
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to be "gender-neutral," even if it results in a differential impact on
one gender, courts will apply the deferential rational basis review
standard.4 ° For example, in Geduldig v. Aiello, the denial of state dis-
ability insurance benefits for disability relating to normal pregnan-
cies was deemed to be a facially neutral classification that "divide[d]
potential recipients into two groups - pregnant women and non-
pregnant persons."'
A gender-neutral classification can exist even when the differ-
ential impact flows from the consequences of an earlier sex-based
classification, as is found in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts
v. Feeney.' In Feeney, the Supreme Court held that a Massachusetts
statute that explicitly preferred the hiring of veterans for civil ser-
vice appointments was deemed to be a gender-neutral classification,
because the statute gave "preference for veterans of either sex over
nonveterans of either sex."143 The Court held that this was so even
though the governmental processes through which one could become
a veteran excluded most women; in fact, for decades a two percent
quota limit was "placed on the numbers [of women] who could enlist,"
and women were neither eligible for the draft, nor for many of the
positions within the armed forces.' At the time of the litigation,
"over 98% of the veterans in Massachusetts were male; [and] only
1.8% were female."'45 The Court nevertheless deemed the classifi-
cation to be gender-neutral and applied rational basis review.'46
Some of the states that do so include California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington. Id.
§ 302[5] [a] & n.109.
140. Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979). A state actor merely
needs to show that the government action at issue is a rational means to an end that
may be legitimately pursued by the government - the lowest standard of constitutional
review. Id.
141. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 492, 496-97 & n.20 (1974).
142. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 277-78.
143. Id. at 256, 280.
144. Id. at 269-70 & n.21.
145. Id. at 270. The Feeney Court found that lawmakers had no intent to discriminate
based on sex when passing the law, and found that granting preference to veterans for
civil service positions was a rational means to a legitimate end - rewarding veterans
for their service. Id. at 277-78. The policy was, therefore, deemed constitutional under the
rational basis standard. Id.
146. Id. In contrast to the Supreme Court holding in Feeney, some states have applied
strict scrutiny when a classification appears gender neutral on its face, but is shown
to have a disparate impact on members of one sex. See FRIESEN, supra note 139,
§ 3.02[5][b]. For example, California has adopted the rule that "[a] seemingly neutral
statute which actually disqualifies a disproportionate number of one sex is discriminatory
and vulnerable to the strict scrutiny test." Id. (quoting Boren v. Cal. Dep't of Employment
Dev., 130 Cal. Rptr. 683, 687 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)). In 1976, California held an unemploy-
ment statute subject to strict scrutiny and ultimately unconstitutional under the state
constitution, because the statute primarily negatively affected women, even though it
also affected some men. See Boren, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 684-88. The statute in question
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2. Should Jail Early Release Policies Be Evaluated as
Gender-Based Classifications?
Early release policies in jails that have different effects on men
and women tend to take two forms. Some policies are clearly gender
based. For example, Los Angeles has a completely different early re-
lease policy for women than it does for men, while Cincinnati's policy
uses overt gender-based classifications to allow all nonviolent women
to be released before any men are released. 4" These policies are sim-
ilar to the sex-based classifications in Craig v. Boren, where one set
of rules applied to women and the other to men.
148
On the other hand, most county jails use the same, neutrally-
worded policy among men and women, but apply it differently to the
separate male and female units of a jail depending on how over-
crowded each section is.'49 For example, when the male jail unit is
overcrowded, jail administrators will begin releasing male inmates
early - independent of whether they are already releasing similarly
sentenced women. 50 If the women's unit is not overcrowded, they will
not release any women but will release their similarly situated male
counterparts.' 5 ' In these cases, the determination of whether the poli-
cies are gender neutral or gender based is more difficult because the
policy on its face seems gender neutral - to release inmates early
when there is overcrowding.
A close analogy can be made to Feeney, because the jails' neu-
trally-worded early release policies under contention derive from a
gender based, yet legally permissible policy: the policy of segregating
men and women into separate jail units.'52 Similarly in Feeney, the
disqualified secondary breadwinners from receiving unemployment benefits when they
left jobs to care for a relative, including the period during which they sought new employ-
ment. Id. at 684-85.
147. Telephone Interview with Source 1, supra note 1; Telephone Interview with
Source 8, supra note 34.
148. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 191-92 (1976).
149. Telephone Interview with Source 3, supra note 3 (indicating that while the release
system is based on a gender neutral plan, disparate treatment occurs in light of the fact
that women's beds are less likely to be overcrowded and women are less likely to be eli-
gible for certain programs); Telephone Interview with Source 6, supra note 8; Telephone
Interview with Source 7, supra note 8; Telephone Interview with Source 10, supra note
36 (indicating that the jail releases prisoners by a gender neutral system, but the release
rate between women and men differs based on which unit is overcrowded at the time).
150. E.g., Telephone Interview with Source 3, supra note 3; Telephone Interview with
Source 7, supra note 8.
151. E.g., Telephone Interview with Source 3, supra note 3; Telephone Interview with
Source 7, supra note 8.
152. Courts have not directly addressed the question of the constitutionality of the
segregation in jails and prisons by gender, but very likely would uphold this practice.
This policy would survive intermediate scrutiny analysis due to the potential for unwanted
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gender-neutral policy of favoring veterans in public service hiring
and promotions was based on the consequences of the gender based,
but permissible governmental policies for determining veteran status
that excluded most women.153 When analyzing such early release
policies, courts could identify this apparent similarity and decide -
wrongly - to apply Feeney's rational basis review standard.
However, there is a crucial distinction from Feeney that should
instead lead a court to infer that the classification is actually gender
based. Unlike the policy of segregating women and men into separate
jail sections, the government's veteran classification in Feeney did not
include all men and exclude all women, and so there was a somewhat
more attenuated relationship between veteran status and gender.'
In Feeney, the government used quotas for many years to keep the
proportions of women in the armed forces below two percent and did
not include women in the draft.155 But while the numbers of veterans
were largely male, a substantial number of women were still able to
become veterans.15 The policy did disproportionately advantage men,
but some women also benefitted from the policy: based on the num-
bers given in the Feeney transcript, an estimated 25,000 women in
Massachusetts were veterans in 1970,157 so having veteran status was
or unplanned pregnancies, the risk of more pimping and prostitution, and the perceived
safety threat to the women prisoners in a mixed-gender facility. See Kennedy, supra note
23, at 78-79 (discussing the disadvantages of gender integrated correctional facilities).
With regard to gender classifications for prison personnel, the Supreme Court has held
that the presence of female corrections officers would pose a security threat to the entire
penitentiary in the Title VII employment discrimination case Dothard v. Rawlinson, where
female correction officers were prohibited from serving as guards in "'contact"' positions
in maximum-security prisons for men. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335-37 (1977).
The Court found that "[tihe likelihood that inmates would assault a woman because she
was a woman would pose a real threat not only to the victim of the assault but also to
the basic control of the penitentiary and protection of its inmates and the other security
personnel." Id. at 336. Courts would likely view this problem as compounded if there
were female inmates in such a facility.
Cases either claim that sex-segregated prisons and jails have been historically accepted
in the United States, or mention that this underlying practice was not challenged in the
particular case being reviewed and, therefore, is not within the court's scope of constitu-
tional review. See, e.g., Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep't of Corr. v. District of Columbia,
93 F.3d 910, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450, 1458 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (noting the absence of any challenge by appellants to the gender segregation prac-
tices involved). A small number of gender integrated correctional facilities do exist, how-
ever. See Barry Ruback, The Sexually Integrated Prison: A Legal and Policy Evaluation,
in COED PRISON 33, 34 (John Ortiz Smykla ed., 1980).
153. Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 269-70, 275 (1979).
154. Id. at 274-75.
155. Id. at 269-70 & n.21.
156. See id.
157. Id. at 270. The Massachusetts population was approximately 5.7 million in 1970
around the time that the Feeney litigation commenced. See CensusScope, Massachusetts:
Population Growth, http://www.censusscope.org/us/s25/chart-popl.html (last visited
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not necessarily synonymous with being male. Therefore, the fact that
the government gave a lifetime preference in civil service hiring
(which represented about sixty percent of the public jobs in the state)
to those individuals with veteran status (with at least one day of
"'wartime"' service) was not a facial sex classification.158
The Court in Feeney stressed that the veteran preference was
"extended to women under a very broad statutory definition of the
term veteran," and that the law was "a preference for veterans of
either sex over nonveterans of either sex, not for men over women."
159
By making this emphasis, it seems that if women were completely
excluded from the country's armed forces, implying a perfect causal
relationship, Feeney would likely have been evaluated under inter-
mediate scrutiny. 6 °
Conversely, in the case of a jail's early release policy, the original
gender-based policy segregating all women from all men in the jails
has a perfect, one hundred percent causal relationship with gender.
It is upon this completely gender-based policy that jails' seemingly
gender-neutral early release policies are based. Thus, in reality the
early release policy is also gender based, because the gender-based
property of the policy of sex segregating inmates is transferred to it.
While the segregation of jail inmates by sex into separate units
(e.g., unit A for women and unit B for men) is constitutional, once seg-
regated, a policy applied differently to unit A versus unit B remains
a facial sex classification, because it applies exclusively to individuals
of one gender and does, in fact, "neatly divide the sexes into winners
and losers."' 6 ' It is clear that if a policy dealt with inmates from unit
A, every prisoner affected by the policy would be a woman, and no
prisoner affected by the policy would be a man. Though not obvious
at first, this is similar to other gender-based policies, such as that in
Craig v. Boren, where all men were restricted from buying 3.2% beer
before age twenty-one, while women could buy the same beer at age
eighteen.'
6 2
Other cases have made similar findings, such as West v. Virginia
Department of Corrections, one of the few other cases dealing with sex
discrimination in early release policies.'63 In West, a female inmate
Mar. 22, 2009) (charting the population of Massachusetts from 1960-2000). One quarter
of the Massachusetts population at the time were veterans (approximately 1.4 million),
and women comprised 1.8% of the veteran population. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 270. This meant
that roughly 25,000 women were veterans in Massachusetts in 1970.
158. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 261-62, 274.
159. Id. at 279-80.
160. See id.
161. Jackson v. Thornburgh, 907 F.2d 194, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
162. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 191-92 (1976).
163. West v. Va. Dep't of Corr., 847 F. Supp. 402 (W.D. Va. 1994).
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challenged a Virginia policy that provided a boot camp pilot program
sentencing option only to male offenders."M The camp allowed partic-
ipants to be released much earlier than their sentences would have
prescribed." The policy limited participation in the pilot program to
men only, on the grounds that men's prisons were more overcrowded
than the women's and male recidivism was more "pressing."'66 Al-
though the wording of the statute was gender neutral, the federal
district court held that a gender-based classification existed because
the program was accessible only to male inmates, not to any female
inmates and, consequently, only men received the favorable sentenc-
ing provisions, 67 so the court analyzed the policy under the interme-
diate scrutiny standard.16
This distinction between partial causation versus perfect cau-
sation is also followed in recent sex discrimination cases involving
school sports teams. 69 Like jails, public school sports teams are per-
missibly segregated by sex, 7' and their gender-neutral policy of se-
lecting seasons by team is completely causally dependent upon the
permissible, gender-based policy of segregation by sex. In recent cases,
courts have found that scheduling of single-sex sports teams was a
facial gender-based classification, and have consistently applied the
United States v. Virginia (VMJ) intermediate scrutiny standard. 171
For example, in Communities for Equity v. Michigan High School
Athletic Association (MHSAA), female athletes in Michigan chal-
lenged the scheduling of high school girls' sports in "nontraditional"
seasons under the Equal Protection Clause.1 72 The MHSAA argued
that the scheduling was a facially gender-neutral classification and
that "the 'only facial classification at work in th[e] case was the orig-
inal decision to have separate high school sports teams for boys and
164. Id. at 404.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 406.
167. Id. at 404, 408.
168. Id. at 406.
169. See, e.g., Ritacco v. Norwin Sch. Dist., 361 F. Supp. 930 (W.D. Pa. 1973); see also
Polly S. Woods, Comment, Boys Muscling in on Girls'Sports, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 891, 891-
92 (1992).
170. Courts have asserted that where equal opportunities for both sexes are available,
regulations "requiring separate teams based on sex fosters greater participation in sports"
by women. Ritacco, 361 F. Supp. at 932. Courts have feared that combining genders on
sports teams would result in a substantial risk that "boys would dominate the girls'
programs and deny them an equal opportunity to compete in interscholastic events."
O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ., 449 U.S. 1301, 1307 (1980). Thus, courts typically permit -
and encourage - single-sex teams.
171. See, e.g., Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n (MHSAA), 459 F.3d
676, 693-94 (6th Cir. 2006); cf. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275,
279 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding the lack of nondiscriminatory factors underlying sports team
scheduling policies central to upholding judgment against schools for violating Title IX).
172. MHSAA, 459 F.3d at 679.
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girls." 173 It argued that once single-sex programs had been permit-
ted, choices regarding the implementation of those programs, such
as "scheduling, uniforms, [and] coaches," did not classify the players
by gender.'74
The Sixth Circuit disagreed, clarifying that the seasonal sched-
uling differences on the basis of gender were indeed facial classifica-
tions, because the MHSAA mandated that different sex teams play
sports in different seasons.'75 The court suggested there was no rea-
son why girls alone should be scheduled in disadvantageous seasons
and held the MHSAA had failed to meet their burden under inter-
mediate scrutiny. Indeed, they held once separate teams by gender
had been conceded as a facial classification, rules and policies made
for each separate team would also be deemed facial classifications
when they created disparate impact between the two genders,'76
based again on the perfect causal relationship between gender and
team assignment. If, however, sports teams were coeducational and
scheduled for the same sport in different seasons, even in small pro-
portion, the court would likely not find any difference in treatment
between them to be a facial classification, because the relationship
between gender and the composition of teams would no longer be per-
fectly causal. Thus, by employing such logic, the courts in MHSAA
and similar cases consistently applied the intermediate scrutiny
standard of VMI, 77 rather than the rational basis review standard
of Feeney.'78
Conversely, the logic of another sex discrimination case concern-
ing early prison release policies correctly followed Feeney, because
the facts there dealt with policies that did not have a perfectly causal
relationship with gender.'79 In Jackson v. Thornburgh, the D.C.
Circuit evaluated the constitutionality of a statute that granted early
release based on "Good Time Credits" to prisoners serving sentences
in District of Columbia facilities, but did not apply to long-term fe-
male offenders who were housed in a federal facility.' 0 Due to over-
crowding in prisons, the District of Columbia maintained no prison
facility for women serving sentences greater than one year, but in-
stead sent these women to a federal facility in West Virginia, along
with a large number of the District's male inmates.' 8 '
173. Id. at 694 (quoting the MHSAA).
174. Id.
175. See id. at 694-95.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 693, 695.
178. See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273-74, 281 (1979).
179. Jackson v. Thornburgh, 907 F.2d 194, 195-96 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
180. Id. at 195.
181. Id. at 196. "Under D.C. Code § 24-425, the Attorney General of the United States
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Relying on Feeney, the Jackson court found the classification to
be gender neutral, because the burdened class of prisoners included
a large number of males and favored some females - those who were
sentenced to terms of one year or less who were housed in District
facilities.'82 In fact, pursuant to this practice, only 323 female of-
fenders were housed in the federal facility compared to 1,789 male
offenders, meaning that "almost a six-to-one ratio of men [were]
denied extra good time over women."' Unlike the jail early release
policies discussed above, but like Feeney, this statute was based on
policies that had only a partially causal relationship with gender,
because both men and women were housed in federal facilities. The
Jackson court held that because the D.C. policy, like the policy in
Feeney, did "not neatly divide the sexes into winners and losers,"
rational basis scrutiny should be applied."M Thus, it can be inferred
that if the policy had "neatly divide[d] the sexes into winners and
losers,"'"m and only women were housed in the federal facilities where
they could not take advantage of good time credits, then intermediate
scrutiny would have been applied by the Jackson court.
The perfect causal relationship between gender and jail housing
units means that an early release policy is a facial gender-based clas-
sification subject to intermediate scrutiny. Some may counter that
in the context of jails' early release policies, the fact that the policies
favor women in some cases, while favoring men in others, means that
they are not gender-based policies. But the fact that the gender bene-
fitted by the policy may change over time does not undermine the fact
that the policy is motivated by a gender-based classification, which
requires application of heightened scrutiny under the Constitution.
This argument would be similar to a twist on the Craig v. Boren
policy, where one year men would be permitted to buy 3.2% beer at
age twenty-one, and women at age eighteen, and the next year women
designates the place of confinement, 'whether maintained by the District of Columbia
government, the federal government, or otherwise,' for all persons convicted of crimes in
the District." Id. 'Under this provision District offenders of both sexes have been assigned
to federal facilities and are currently serving sentences there." Id.
182. Id. at 196-97.
183. Id. at 197. Meanwhile, approximately 150 female offenders benefitted from the
early release statute because they were housed in District facilities. Id.
184. Id. Under the rational basis review, the court found "[t]here is no hint that the
legislative distinction arose from invidious purposes," or from "'archaic and stereotypic
notions' of gender." Id. (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725
(1982)). In fact, the court determined that "the fulfillment of the District's constitutional
obligation to avoid unlawful overcrowding of its prisons" justified the policy. Id. at 198.
185. See id. at 197.
186. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 191-92 (1976).
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would be permitted to buy the beer at age twenty-one and men at age
eighteen. The policy would still be considered gender-based, regard-
less of the fact that it favored genders differently each year.
D. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny
Courts should find that a gender-based classification has been
established and that male and female inmates are similarly situated.
Accordingly the burden should shift to the government to justify that
classification and show it is "exceedingly persuasive" under the inter-
mediate scrutiny standard, as required by VMI.8 7 A challenged classi-
fication must serve "'important governmental objectives,"' and the
state must show "'that the discriminatory means employed' are 'sub-
stantially related to the achievement of those objectives."'18 8 The
state's "justification must be genuine," and "it must not rely on over-
broad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or pref-
erences of males and females."' 9 The VMICourt moved examinations
of sex-based classifications closer to strict scrutiny than the Court had
employed in previous sex discrimination cases.'9 ° In VMI, the Court
reiterated that to be defined as "substantially related," the gender-
based policy must be shown to directly serve the important interest,'9 '
and no alternative policy that is not gender based can equally pro-
mote that interest.
192
County jails could put forth a number of different potential im-
portant state interests to justify their gender-based early release
policies that are likely to be acceptable to most courts, including:
public safety, the need to ease jail overcrowding, administrative effi-
ciency, and cost savings. Courts should rule that public safety and
overcrowding are important - and even compelling - state interests,
187. United States v. Virginia (VM!), 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (quoting Hogan, 458
U.S. at 724) (citations omitted).
188. Id. at 533 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724).
189. Id. The Court continued, "'[i]nherent differences' between men and women, we
have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the
members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual's opportunity." Id. In
applying this standard, the Court found that the justification that single-sex education
"fosters diversity in educational approaches," though perhaps an important objective,
was not genuinely served by VMI's educational benefit only being offered to males, while
no equal program was being offered to females. Id. at 516, 524-25, 534-40. The Court also
found that VMI's mission and methodology were suitable for women. Id. at 540-46. Thus,
the Court required that women be admitted to VMI. Id. at 557-58.
190. In states such as California where strict scrutiny is applied to sex-based classi-
fications, the government must show that the classification serves a compelling state
interest and that the means are narrowly tailored to meet that interest. See FRIESEN, supra
note 139, §§ 3.01[1] & n.2 (noting California case law holding sex as a suspect class),
3.02[2] & n.64 (explaining what is required for strict scrutiny review), 3.02[5][a].
191. See VM, 518 U.S. at 524, 533, 545.
192. See id. at 540-46.
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but should not find administrative efficiency to be important. For all
of these interests, however, courts should not find that the discrimi-
natory means employed are substantially related to the achievement
of such interests.
1. Ensuring Public Safety
Courts would likely rule that public safety is an important, and
even a compelling state interest, given that the Supreme Court has
held goals protecting the safety of members of the public to be im-
portant. These interests have included protecting the public from
drunk driving accidents in Craig v. Boren (an "important govern-
mental objective"),'93 protecting prison inmates and guards from vio-
lence in Johnson v. California (a "compelling" state interest),194 and
protecting young girls from pregnancy in Michael M. v. Superior
Court of Sonoma County (an important state interest).195 Concerning
jail early release policies, courts are again likely to rule that protect-
ing the safety of the public - for example, from additional inmates
who would commit crimes if they were released early from jail,
solely because members of the opposite sex are being released early
- is an important state interest.1 96
Courts should not, however, find that releasing inmates early
differentially by gender is substantially related to the achievement of
public safety. In Johnson, there was some basis for segregating by
race, because prison officials believed that "violence and conflict would
result if prisoners were not segregated," but the lower court still held
on remand that the prison would have the burden of proving the seg-
regation was narrowly tailored.'97 Similarly, in Craig, the defendant
state did show data that males under twenty-one were involved in
more traffic accidents involving alcohol - but this still did not enable
the Court to find that the gender classification was substantially re-
lated to preventing traffic accidents.'98 In cases of jail release policies,
the relationship between the gender-based early release policies and
the objective of public safety is far less direct, and therefore courts
should not deem it substantially related.
193. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-200 (1976).
194. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 512, 514 (2005).
195. Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 479 (1981).
196. In fact, it could be argued that the interest in protecting the public from those
who have previously violated the law, and have not finished serving their jail sentences,
is greater than protecting those inside prisons from violence. Some violence is expected
within prisons; guards enter such positions with this knowledge, and the violence is
removed from the general public.
197. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 503, 515.
198. Craig, 429 U.S. at 201-04.
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Jail administrators might argue that the most straightforward
alternative to their current gender-based early release policies - re-
leasing equal numbers of inmates of the opposite gender - would
lead to decreased public safety, because if not incapacitated, those
inmates could be out harming the public.' 9 However, there are many
other gender-neutral solutions which do not have this result. For ex-
ample, a scoring system to release the least dangerous inmates, inde-
pendent of gender, is actually more aligned with the goal of public
safety than a policy based on gender.
2. Alleviating Overcrowding
Courts should rule that easing jail overcrowding is an impor-
tant state interest in order to prevent the tension and fights associ-
ated with being housed in close quarters, as well as the inhumane
conditions in which inmates could be forced to live.200 The District
Court for the Western District of Virginia in West v. Virginia Depart-
ment of Corrections found combating overcrowding to be an impor-
tant state interest.20' Moreover, alleviating overcrowding is directly
related to jail security, which was ruled a compelling state interest in
Johnson v. California.°2
Though jail officials may argue that gender-based early release
policies are substantially related to solving overcrowding, given the
separation by gender in the jails, courts should not find that releasing
inmates early differentially by gender is substantially related to the
achievement of easing jail overcrowding. In West, the state argued
that administering a pilot boot camp program, which greatly reduced
men's sentences, was substantially related to the goals of reducing
prison overcrowding and recidivism, because these problems were
"most pressing" in the men's prisons and the government had limited
funds to assess the program.2 3 But the court found the opposite, be-
cause opening the program to men only was not substantially related
to achieving reduced overcrowding and recidivism in the women'sprisons.2 4 The court found that even if differences existed which
199. See Leonard et. al., supra note 57 (explaining the recent history of early releases
in Los Angeles County jails and discussing specific early released inmates who killed
or harmed innocent members of the public when they otherwise would have been
incarcerated).
200. Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450, 1456 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
201. See West v. Va. Dep't of Corr., 847 F. Supp. 402, 406-07 (W.D. Va. 1994).
202. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 513.
203. West, 847 F. Supp. at 404, 406-07.
204. Id. at 407. The court stated that "[i]f defendants' argument were carried to its
logical extension, then the same argument could be used to deny women inmates the
opportunity for education, vocational training or rehabilitation," and that "[s]urely such
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justified treating inmates differently by gender, "there was no com-
pelling interest in providing male and female offenders with such
unequal sentencing options." 20 ' The West court held that the Equal
Protection Clause is violated whenever "an extremely favorable sen-
tencing alternative is provided to one class of inmates and not another,
and when that classification is based solely on the inmates' gender.
Officials may argue that, unlike West, the jail programs that con-
sistently release one gender early, but rarely release members of the
other sex, would achieve goals of reducing jail overcrowding when
the gender being released early is the gender that lives in the over-
crowded unit. But this would still not be substantially related, be-
cause jail officials could take other measures, such as rearranging
space or reassigning some space to the other gender. Continually re-
leasing one gender early for many years, while members of the other
gender serve out their entire sentences, is not substantially related
to ending overcrowding in this case.
The problem becomes more complex, however, in situations where
the number of male and female inmates released early fluctuates day
by day - and fluctuates between genders. West does not discuss this
issue, and the school sports cases seem to hint that this practice is
constitutional to meet logistics concerns. The MHSAA court found
that discriminatory scheduling was not "substantially related" to
achieving the stated objectives, because it did "'not justify forcing
girls to bear all of the disadvantageous playing seasons alone to solve
the logistical problems.' 207 The court held that a compliance plan
must disadvantage and advantage boys and girls equally. 20 Sim-
ilarly, in the McCormick case, members of high school girls' soccer
teams sued their school districts to reschedule their seasons from the
spring to the fall, when most other New York state girls' teams played
and when regional and state championships took place. 2°' That court
found that the girls' teams should not have to bear alone the costs
of administrative difficulties the school districts used to justify the
season schedule.210 Instead, it suggested that to avoid such problems,
an inequitable distribution of resources is not contemplated by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Id.
205. Id. at 408.
206. Id.
207. Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n (MHSAA), 459 F.3d 676, 693
(6th Cir. 2006) (quoting the district court, Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic
Ass'n 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 850 (W.D. Mich. 2001)). The "MHSAA could, after all, rearrange
the schedules and require some of the male sports to play in disadvantageous seasons
without increasing the overall use of the facilities." Id. at 693-94.
208. See id. at 693-95.
209. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 279-80 (2d Cir. 2004).
210. Id. at 297-99.
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the boys and girls teams could alternate seasons by year, so that both
were equally advantaged and disadvantaged.2 1'
State officials may cite this finding in the sports team cases to
suggest that policies which some days release men early at higher
rates than women, but then release women at higher rates on other
days, are in fact substantially related to solving the logistical prob-
lems of jail overcrowding. But such a solution, where a state policy
alternates by gender, favoring one gender one year and the other
gender the next, would not apply in the jail early release setting.
Unlike girls and boys on sports teams, where males and females
would be equally advantaged and disadvantaged because they typi-
cally spend four years in high school - and so would spend two years
playing in the advantaged season and two years playing in the non-
advantaged season - male and female inmates affected by disparate
early release policies cannot be both advantaged and disadvantaged
by them. Once a woman gets the advantage of early release, she is
no longer impacted by future release policies. Her male counterpart
is always disadvantaged when compared to the female inmate be-
cause he has to serve more jail time for the same crime and sentence.
Similarly, in jail policies that vary by year, the individuals who are
favored one year will not be the same ones who are disfavored during
the following year - even if it favors women one year and men the
next - because the policy will not affect the same group of inmates
the next year.
Finally, the fact that early release policies concern the total
restriction of an individual's liberty makes it even more important
that men and women on the individual level be similarly advantaged
and disadvantaged. There could be cases when individual children
on sports teams would not be evenly advantaged and disadvantaged:
for example, if a boy decides to play a sport during a year that hap-
pens to be disadvantaged, but does not play that sport the following
year, when he would have been advantaged. It is a much more sig-
nificant restriction to hold someone in jail for an extra year, month,
or even a day longer than someone similarly situated, than it is for a
student to play soccer in a less convenient season than their similarly
situated female counterpart.212
211. Id. at 297.
212. This notion that the degree of justification required varies with the severity of the
discrimination can be illustrated with an example. In women's basketball, players use
a slightly smaller ball (approximately one inch smaller) because women's hands tend to
be smaller than men's hands. See, e.g., Adam Khan, History of Women's Basketball,
(Dec. 7, 2008), http://www.articlesbase.com/basketball-articles/history-of-women-basketball-
674314.html. Although this is a sex-based classification between teams of different
gender, it is unlikely to be struck down under intermediate scrutiny, as neither gender
suffers as a consequence of the policy.
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3. Enhancing Administrative Efficiency
Some might argue that administrative convenience and cost sav-
ings are important state interests and that administering separate
early release policies by gender is substantially related to the achieve-
ment of these goals. It is administratively easier and cheaper, the
argument would go, to administer early release programs differently
by gender, because each gender's beds become overcrowded at differ-
ent rates. It is too difficult to administer on an equal basis early re-
lease programs for men and women who have committed the same
crime and have the same sentence. Moreover, it would be too costly
to make changes to the current policies or build new jail space to
house all inmates for their entire sentences so that neither gender
is advantaged or disadvantaged.
The above arguments should not pass intermediate scrutiny
because the Supreme Court has held on a number of occasions that
administrative efficiency and cost savings are not enough to justify
different treatment by gender.213 In a plurality opinion, the Court
held in Frontiero v. Richardson that distinctly different treatment
of men and women "solely for the purpose of achieving administrative
convenience.., involves the 'very kind of arbitrary legislative choice
forbidden by the [Constitution]." 214 Stanley v. Illinois held that al-
though "[p]rocedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than
individualized determination," an administratively more efficient,
but gender-based statute, was invalid under intermediate scrutiny.215
The Court's restrictions on gender-based classifications remained
even when gender "appeared to have substantial value in predicting
an admittedly important fact." 216 At the time that Craig v. Boren was
decided, "men were more likely than women to have experience in for-
mal business matters," 217 and at the time of Frontiero and Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld, the Court acknowledged that it was much more common
for women to be dependent on their husbands as the "breadwinner"
than for the opposite to be true.218 However, the Court found that
213. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The
Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 2192-93 nn.168-69 (1995)
(discussing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,637-39 (1975); Frontierov. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 689-91 (1973), Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971)).
214. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690 (quoting Reed, 404 U.S. at 76-77).
215. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656-58.
216. Schulhofer, supra note 213, at 2193.
217. Id. at 2193.
218. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 681,688-89; see also Weinberger, 420 U.S. at, 644-45 (discuss-
ing men as "primary supporters"). The Court found in Frontiero:
our prior decisions make clear that, although efficacious administration of
governmental programs is not without some importance, "the Constitution
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"such generalizations, even if empirically accurate, could not justify
categorically different treatment of the sexes." 219 Moreover, the sex-
based generalizations were, in fact, accurate at the time due to past
gender discrimination and cultural norms, and "the facts for which
gender was used as a proxy (business experience and dependency)
could be ascertained more directly and more accurately by a factual
hearing." 220 As administrative efficiency and cost containment are not
compelling state interests, courts should not be required to assess
whether the early release policies are substantially related to achiev-
ing those objectives potentially alleged by a state.221
III. A GENDER-NEUTRAL PROPOSAL FOR FUTURE JAIL EARLY
RELEASE POLICIES
A. Some Potential Options
Jail officials can avail themselves of several intuitively evident
alternatives to remedy this constitutional problem, each with positive
features, as well as meaningful drawbacks. One unattractive option,
given jail and sheriff departments' budget constraints, would be for
jail administrators and their political allies to raise money to build
more jails to alleviate overcrowding without early release. Though
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency." ... On the contrary,
any statutory scheme which draws a sharp line between the sexes, solely for
the purpose of achieving administrative convenience, necessarily commands
"dissimilar treatment for men and women who are.., similarly situated,"
and therefore involves the "very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden
by the [Constitution] .... "
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690 (citations omitted).
219. Schulhofer, supra note 213, at 2193.
220. Id. The Court has also struck down cost efficiency arguments under strict scrutiny
review. For instance, in Shapiro v. Thompson, the Court struck down state policies re-
quiring one year waiting periods before new citizens could obtain state welfare benefits,
even though it meant that the state might have to pay much more in welfare benefits to
new residents. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,622-23,627-28,633 (1969). The Court
said that while "a State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its pro-
grams," it "may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes
of its citizens." Id. at 633.
221. Although sex-based policies justified by administrative efficiency have not suc-
ceeded under intermediate scrutiny in the past, it is conceivable that there exists a point
at which the administrative cost is so high that the Court would accept a certain level
of discrimination as justifiable. See Schulhofer, supra note 213, at 2196. For example,
if the only alternative remedy for the problem of unequal jail early release policies by
gender required the state to spend ten billion dollars to quickly build more jails under
a highly expedited schedule, courts applying the intermediate scrutiny standard likely
would not require a state to pursue such a costly alternative. In real world cases, however,
some other variable could be adjusted to reduce the administrative burden without
engaging in discrimination.
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this approach is clearly constitutional, its drawbacks include that it
is prohibitively expensive and that it does not use public resources
in an optimal manner, particularly because many nonviolent inmates
pose little threat to society even when released early. A second,
better option would be for jails to release men and women who have
committed similar crimes and received similar sentences at the same
time. This would be constitutional because men and women would be
serving the same amount of time and neither group is advantaged
or disadvantaged, but the drawback likely to be argued by commu-
nity security advocates is that jails would release more offenders
earlier than necessary and leave empty jail beds. For example, if the
women's jail unit was more overcrowded than the men's, but men and
women with the same sentences were released at the same time, re-
gardless of whether the men's unit had empty beds, some men would
be released early who did not have to be released for overcrowding
reasons.
An example of this policy in practice is Larimer County, Colorado,
where all jail inmates are serving only seventy-five percent of their
sentence in order to ensure no overcrowding in either gender's unit.
2 2
This approach is constitutional because there is no differential treat-
ment by gender, however, community security advocates may argue
that it will likely result in the release of potentially dangerous in-
mates, purely for the sake of gender parity, even when the correc-
tional facility actually has the capacity to hold them.
B. My Proposal
Though correcting gender disparity in early release programs
is difficult, I believe that there is a solution more innovative than
those previously discussed that would fulfill the requirements of the
Constitution, while remaining administratively feasible. My proposed
model recognizes that early release policies are necessary because
jails are overcrowded, public money is (rightly) not typically avail-
able to greatly expand jail capacity to the extent necessary to elimi-
nate early release policies, and it is not the optimal use of public
finances to build enormous quantities of new jail space to accommo-
date one hundred percent of every sentence. The option I propose
draws from current best practices in jail early release policies and has
two parts.
222. Telephone Interview with Source 5, supra note 8; see also Telephone Interview
with Source 14, in Or. (Feb. 16, 2007) (notes on file with author) (stating they are
mandated to divest twenty-five percent of inmates from the system).
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1. Use Best Practices Criteria for Releasing Early the Inmates
Who Are Least Dangerous
First, in order to minimize future violent crimes by released in-
mates, each jail should base their early release policies on factors that
reliably predict an inmate's future propensity for violence and danger
to the public. These factors would include weighted criteria, such as
the type of crime, sentence length, criminal history, good behavior
while incarcerated,223 and other predictors that researchers have
found to forecast future violence.224 These criteria should interact
with the amount of time an inmate has already served to generate a
number rank for each inmate, which can be used to create a ranked
list of all inmates on a daily basis.
A few jurisdictions already do this, but they rank inmates within
each gender so that they have one ranked list for male inmates and
a second ranked list for female inmates.225 Instead, I advocate for one
total list of all inmates regardless of gender. Then when the jail be-
comes overcrowded, the jail administrators will release inmates early
according to the ranked list. For example, if the jail was overcrowded
by twenty people, then the lowest ranked (i.e., least dangerous) twenty
inmates would be released early - that might be thirteen women and
seven men, or twenty men and no women. The genders would not be
treated equally in terms of percentage released (as they generally do
not pose the same risks to society),226 but would be treated equally in
223. Telephone Interview with Source 14, supra note 222.
224. Criminologists and experts in this field have developed several different types of
algorithms to do this. See, e.g., Peter Hoffman & James Beck, The Origin of the Federal
Criminal History Score, 9 FED. SEN'G REP. 192, 192-94 (1997) (discussing the similarities
and differences between the Criminal History and Salient Factor Scores); Peter B.
Hoffman, Twenty Years of Operational Use of a Risk Prediction Instrument: The United
States Parole Commission's Salient Factor Score, 22 J. CRIM. JUST. 477, 478-77, app. 1
at 490 (1994) (discussing the "recidivism prediction instrument" called the "Salient
Factor Score" and how it makes predictions); BRIAN J. OSTROM ET. AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS & VA. CRIM. SENTG COMM'N, OFFENDER RISKASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA 23-
30 (2002), available at http://www.vcsc.state.va.us/riskoffrpt.pdf (discussing utilization
of "[aictuarial (or statistical) risk assessment" to study factors influencing recidivism).
However, determining which factors to account for and how to weigh each of them is
beyond the scope of this Article. In implementing such a system, jail administrators
should be careful that the factors do not directly or indirectly discriminate against inmates
based on race or socioeconomic background.
225. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Source 6, supra note 8. But see Telephone
Interview with Source 14, supra note 222 (stating men and women are ranked on the
same eight weighted criteria, but explaining men and women receive different scores
because of factors like age and likelihood of recidivism).
226. A number of studies have found that female offenders pose far less of a risk to
society than males. See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 213, at 2195-96 & n.182 (discussing
what studies have shown to be differences in men and women prisoners, including that
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the sense that they are evaluated using objective criteria as opposed
to the constitutionally problematic classification of gender. Thus,
people who have the same sentence will not necessarily serve the
same amount of time, but jails will release people who are the least
dangerous to society. The fact that this approach may over-release
inmates of one gender relative to that gender's jail capacity constraints
would be addressed, as discussed below, by a reallocation of short-
term capacity.
2. Optimize Space Between Genders and Include Flex-Space
In order to ensure that the number of inmates of each gender
released complies with the ranking system, jail administrators will
need to allocate capacity so that the amount of overcrowding by gen-
der closely tracks the number of releases implied by the ranking
system. This would involve tracking trends in female and male in-
mate populations in order to know how many inmates of each gen-
der, with each type of sentence, the jail typically houses.227 Many
jails already track this type of information, yet administrators do
not use it to help solve their overcrowding problems across genders,
because they do not know that current policies are likely unconstitu-
tional.22 While the numbers of inmates fluctuate to some extent,
especially on a seasonal basis,229jail administrators assert that their
men begin criminal careers earlier and carry them out longer, are "eight to nine times"
more likely to commit violet crimes, and are more likely to return to prison than women
offenders); PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL. No.
215892, PRISONERS IN 2005, 9 (2006) (stating that in 2003, thirty-five percent of women
in state prisons were sentenced for "violent offenses," while fifty-three percent of men in
state prisons had committed a "violent offense"). Women also pose less risk because of
the kinds of crimes they tend to commit; for example in 2000, approximately "71 percent
of all arrests of women were for larceny/theft or drug-related offenses," and women
accounted for only seventeen percent of violent crime arrests, with three-quarters of those
women charged with simple assault. BARBARA BLOOM ET. AL., U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE & NAT'L
INST. CORR., GENDER-RESPONSIVE STRATEGIES 4 (2003); see also LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N,
STATE OF CAL., BREAKING THE BARRIERS FOR WOMEN ON PAROLE, i (2004) (finding that
"[t]he vast majority of female inmates are not a threat to public safety" and reporting
that "[tiwo-thirds" of female inmates in California "were convicted of property or drug-
related crimes"). In California, women comprise only about three percent of the "high
control" or "second strike" parolees in the state system - a total of 822 female parolees,
as compared to 24,246 male parolees. LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra, at vii.
227. See Telephone Interview with Source 6, supra note 8 (explaining how jail admin-
istrators began to look at who came into the jail, who spent time in the jail, and who got
out of the jail to better understand their overcrowding problems).
228. See, e.g., id. (explaining how the jail began to look closer at the reasons for over-
crowding with the help of management consultants).
229. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Source 4, supra note 4 (discussing population
increase in the spring due to judges allowing people to stay home for the holidays prior
to turning themselves in); Telephone Interview with Source 7, supra note 8 (discussing
offenders permitted to remain out of jail until after the winter holidays, as well as seasonal
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populations of men and women stay relatively constant and can often
be predicted.2"'
When jail administrators understand the number and types of
offenders by gender that they typically house, they can best allocate
their bed space so that the overcrowding in men's and women's units
will result in all inmates serving durations of their sentences deter-
mined by the objective ranking system. This may involve reallocating
some bed space from one gender to the other in jails whose gender-
based releases do not comply with the above described ranking system,
as was done by the Calaveras County Jail.23' In these cases, some
jail space should be reallocated so that inmates of both sexes are re-
leased according to their rankings. This space allocation is made more
challenging by the fact that in almost all counties, women and men
have to be separated by "sight" and "sound.""23 Many jails have re-
allocated space between the sexes in the past,233 and could do so again
by transferring wings or smaller units of a jail to the opposite sex.
Even if jail administrators allocate permanent capacity as ac-
curately as possible, they can never completely predict the fluctua-
tions between the sexes. For example, sometimes police will decide
to do sweeps of drug dealers, bringing in a large group of mostly men,
or will sweep for prostitutes, bringing in a large group of mostly
women. 234 Currently, there seems to be little coordination between
the police and jail systems in many counties in this regard. Moreover,
an inmate's behavior within jail often determines how much time he
or she serves,235 and this can also be difficult to predict, although it
can be accounted for as one criterion in the ranking system described
above.236
In order to prepare for such fluctuation, jails should have some
structural living units that house lower numbers of inmates and can
be reallocated more quickly between genders as needed. Again, this
crime patterns); Telephone Interview with Source 13, supra note 45 (discussing jail popu-
lation declining in the winter and the influence of unemployment on jail population).
230. See Telephone Interview with Source 10, supra note 36 (stating there is not much
fluctuation in the women's unit). But see Telephone Interview with Source 7, supra note
8 (stating the seasonal fluctuations make it hard to plan anything at the prison); Telephone
Interview with Source 10, supra note 36 (suggesting it is hard to predict numbers of
prisoners because things change "all the time").
231. Telephone Interview with Source 4, supra note 4.
232. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Source 4, supra note 4; Telephone Interview
with Source 7, supra note 8; Telephone Interview with Source 6, supra note 8; Telephone
Interview with Source 12, supra note 45.
234. Telephone Interview with Source 10, supra note 36.
235. Id.; Telephone Interview with Source 14, supra note 222; Telephone Interview
with Source 15, in Washtenaw County, Mich. (Feb. 13, 2007) (notes on file with author).
236. Telephone Interview with Source 14, supra note 222.
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can be difficult to plan for because of the sight and sound barriers
that are normally required. One example of living units already used
by county jails that best accommodate such reallocation are pods
which can be built to hold as few as twelve or sixteen inmates.237
Small dormitories can serve this same function.23 As fluctuations
occur in the jails, these pods or small dormitories would serve as
swing units that would be reallocated between the genders based on
fluctuations.
Using a system like this may require limited additional funds,
because some amount of restructuring may be needed. Additionally,
because pods still house at a minimum twelve or sixteen inmates,
the system would still not achieve perfect equity between the genders.
There could be occasions when a few extra inmates of one gender
would have to be released in order to preserve gender equity, lead-
ing to unused beds. But while releasing hundreds of extra prisoners
in the name of gender equity could endanger public safety and would
not likely be an ideal solution according to community security advo-
cates, releasing a few extra people occasionally would not put society
at the same risk.
C. Additional Measures to Reduce Overcrowding
Finally, and of critical importance, counties should take non-
gender-based measures to reduce the overall amount of overcrowding
in their jails. All counties should promote nonjail sentencing alter-
natives for nonviolent offenders, which could include: community-
based reintegration programs (that focus on recovery, mental health,
family reunification, and job skills),"' electronic tethering, 240 and
work release.241 These types of alternatives to incarceration for those
who do not present a risk to society save public money and, arguably,
help those convicted to better reintegrate into society.242
237. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
239. See Nora V. Demleitner, Smart Public Policy: Replacing Imprisonment with
Targeted Nonprison Sentences and Collateral Sanctions, 58 STAN. L. REV. 339, 355
(2005); see also Telephone Interview with Source 15, supra note 235.
240. See Demleitner, supra note 239, at 355; see also Telephone Interview with Source
3, supra note 3; Telephone Interview with Source 12, supra note 41.
241. DUI Foundation, Work Release, http://www.duifoundation.org/legalguide/sentenc
ingalternatives/workrelease/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2009); see also Telephone Interview
with Source 5, supra note 8.
242. Many have argued that convicted individuals placed in such programs are
actually much less likely to recidivate than inmates who have committed similar crimes
who are held in jail. See generally Demleitner, supra note 239.
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Furthermore, because jails also frequently house defendants who
have not yet been tried or sentenced,243 counties can work to mini-
mize pretrial jail stays through the use of arrest processing centers,
where people who are arrested go through the booking process and
have their preliminary hearing on the same day and therefore do
not necessarily have to be held in jail.244 Adding extra courts, such
as night courts, to arraign and try defendants more quickly, instead
of having a large backlog, can also help reduce the number of defen-
dants who are housed in jails prior to conviction and will lead to less
overcrowding.245 The cost of these additional measures would likely be
offset by the reduced cost of a smallerjail population. The Indianapolis
criminal justice system has been successful in implementing such
programs over the past three years.246
CONCLUSION
Many jails have different early release policies for their male and
female jail inmates, or apply the same early release policy differently
to their male and female inmate populations, depending on which
gender's population happens to be overcrowded. Following the 2005
Supreme Court ruling in Johnson,24 along with the federal circuit
and district court decisions on gender discrimination in Pitts24 and
West249 that followed similar reasoning, it is clear that the issue of
sex discrimination in jail early release policies should be evaluated
under the intermediate scrutiny standard set forth for gender-based
classifications in VMI.250 It is also evident that male and female in-
mates who committed similar crimes and received similar sentences
are similarly situated and, thus, may be compared in an equal pro-
tection analysis.
State officials may claim that early release policies are "gender-
neutral," although based on a permissible, gender-based regulation,
similar to Feeney.251 However, as seen in cases such as West 25 2 and
243. E.g., Telephone Interview with Source 3, supra note 3; Telephone Interview with
Source 13, supra note 45 (discussing nine point protocol used to release people, which
includes several categories of pretrial inmates).
244. E.g., Telephone Interview with Source 13, supra note 45.
245. Id. Long waits prior to trials further punish the poor and homeless (whether or
not they are later found guilty), who are often unable to post bail.
246. Id.
247. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
248. Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
249. West v. Va. Dep't of Corr., 847 F. Supp. 402 (W.D. Va. 1994).
250. United States v. Virginia (VM1), 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
251. Pers. Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979).
252. West, 847 F. Supp. at 402 (W.D. Va. 1994).
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MHSAA," 3 because the early release policies are based on and per-
fectly causally related to gender, they should be viewed as "gender-
based" for the purposes of equal protection analysis and deserving
of intermediate scrutiny.2"4 Under intermediate scrutiny analysis,
county jail administrators could assert a number of potentially im-
portant state interests, including public safety, jail security, over-
crowding problems, administrative efficiency, and cost effectiveness.
However, releasing men and women based solely on gender should
not be held substantially related to any of these important state
interests by courts.
As this practice is likely unconstitutional, jails should aim to
alter their policies. A cost-effective, yet public safety oriented solu-
tion would be to (1) release inmates early depending on their danger
to society, via an objective inmate ranking system applied to both gen-
ders together; and (2) dedicate more easily redistributed jail housing
to correct short-term fluctuations between the sexes, such as smaller
pod units or dormitories.
Finally, and of significant importance, counties should aim to re-
duce jail overcrowding in other ways. This should occur pre-sentence,
by cutting down on the waiting time between arrests and hearings;
as well as post-sentence, by employing alternatives to incarceration
for nonviolent inmates, such as work release, electronic tethering,
and placement in community based reintegration programs.
253. Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n (MHSAA), 459 F.3d 676 (6th
Cir. 2006).
254. VMI, 518 U.S. at 531-33.
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